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preme court decisions like Crum, which further establish the
appropriate meaning and scope of a phrase or word (such as




The recent litigation before the First Circuit in Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Houma1 will probably stand for
some time as an example of unparalleled brashness on the part
of a private utility in its relations with a municipally owned
utility. Tiring of its role as supplier of standby capacity to the
municipality as the latter took on additional customers outside
of its municipal limits, the private utility sought to expropriate
the municipal property outside such limits. There is of course
unquestioned statutory power to expropriate private property
for the public use of developing and transmitting electricity for
power and other uses. The general expropriation statute does
not, however, speak to the question of power to expropriate
property already devoted to a public use.2 While the statute
conferring expropriation power on the highway department was
explicit in vesting power to expropriate public as well as private
property,8 in the statute at hand there is no such explicitness;
it is consequently necessary to explore whether the Louisiana
courts have developed a doctrine of expropriation power vested
by necessary implication. The First Circuit turned to common
law authorities for guidance and concluded that there could be
no such implied authority save that arising from a necessity
so absolute that without it the grant itself would be defeated
or rendered meaningless; if applicable, however, the doctrine
would apply whether or not the new use be the same or different
from the present use.4 The court's research also indicated that
the rule that power to expropriate property already in public
use must be express or implied by necessity was subject to an
exception termed a "greater public interest" rule, providing that
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 229 So.2d 202 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, Dec. 11, 1969,
rehearing denied, Dec. 22, 1969.
2. LA. R.S. 19:2(9) (1950).
3. IA. R.S. 48:303 (1950).
4. 229 So.2d 202, 207-08 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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authority to expropriate would be implied (in a setting where
the grant of power would not necessarily be defeated or ren-
dered meaningless) if the further public use for which expropria-
tion was sought was of such great importance as to require the
existing public use to yield to it and it could be accomplished
in no other practical way.5 Having thus formulated a rule for
its guidance, the court turned to the facts before it and found
that the private utility proposed to use the expropriated property
for the same purpose for which it was presently employed and
that a mere allegation that the private utility could furnish
more dependable, better, and less expensive service did not
fulfill the requirement that the new use be of such great im-
portance to the public as to necessarily imply authority to take
property already in public use.6
While proceedings to take property in Louisiana must gen-
erally be conducted before a district court, there is an exception
in the case of property sought to be taken via the police power
from a railway under the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission.7 Thus, the litigation in Kansas City Southern Rail-
way v. Louisiana Public Service Commission5 had its origin
in a proceeding before the Public Service Commission brought
by the Department of Highways against a railroad, seeking a
right of way across its property. Since the right of way was
sought to be taken under the state police power, the requirement
of payment of compensation was eliminated." Our supreme court
found the railroad subject to such a taking, since a railroad
does not hold its right of way in perfect ownership but subject
to the implied charter condition that the state, exercising its
police power, may damage its property if necessary to establish
"new works" necessary to the convenience and safety of the
citizenry.'0 Having established the power of the Department of
Highways to proceed, the court considered whether the com-
mission had abused its discretion since the crossing point ap-
proved was more hazardous than alternative crossing points.
The court so concluded and set aside the commission order."
5. Id. at 211.
6. Id. at 212.
7. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; LA. R.S. 45:841 (1950); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 224 La. 279, 69 So.2d 43 (1953).
8. 254 La. 160, 223 So.2d 132 (1969).
9. 254 La. 160, 168-69, 223 So.2d 132, 135 (1969); 224 La. 279, 284-85, 69 So.2d
43, 45-46 (1953).
10. 254 La, 160, 168-69, 223 So.2d 132, 135 (1969).
11. Id. at 168-78, 223 So.2d at 135-38.
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In Dixie Pipeline Co. v. Barry12 the defense was raised
that the company was without authority to expropriate because
it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Com-
mission and therefore not a public utility. The defendants also
urged that the company was not a common carrier because the
use of its pipeline facilities was limited to customers tendering
10,000 barrels or more of propane gas per month; since the
company did not carry gas for all those offering gas it could not
be a common carrier18 The Third Circuit rejected both of these
arguments, noting that the company was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission because it was
an interstate common carrier and that a common carrier against
whom there was a general public right to a definite use of
property did not lose that status by virtue of imposing condi-
tions, applicable to all shippers alike, as to the use of its
facilities.1 4
In Grayson v. Commissioners of Bossier Levee District"
the Second Circuit applied a constitutional interpretation limit-
ing the appropriation power (as distinguished from the expro-
priation power) of a levee district to lands riparian in character
when first separated from the state.16 While the section of land
in question would have been riparian had it been separated from
the state as a part of a larger parcel located on the river, where
the section was lying away from the river and was sold first
it could no longer be reached by the appropriation power.17
The policy of the constitutional interpretation generally appears
to be one favoring the spreading of levee burdens as broadly
as possible, subject however to the rather erratic effect of the
prior sales of sections lying away from the river but contiguous
with original grants from the public domain; however large
the grant, if riparian in character at the time of its purchase
from the public domain it remained subject to the rule.18 The
court also corrected a misapprehension stemming from an early
decision granting to levee districts control over drainage chan-
12. 227 So.2d 1 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), rehearting denied, Oct. 17, 1969.
13. Id. at 5-6.
14. Id. at 6-7.
15. 229 So.2d 139 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), rehearing denied, Jan. 6, 1970.
16. LA. CONST. art. XVI, § 4 permits property subject to the appropriation
power to be taken in exchange for a payment of the assessed value of the
property as compensation.
17. 229 So.2d 139, 142-45 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
18. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 249 La. 508,
187 So.2d 715 (1966).
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nels for a space of 100 feet on each side of the channel. This
action had been erroneously referred to as an exercise of the
police power and hence arguably an exercise of appropriation
power by the district. However, the Second Circuit pointed out
that the statute actually provided for mere maintenance of
drainage channels and not for vesting of power to appropriate.
As a consequence, the property owner was deemed entitled to
recover the fair market value of the servitude taken for such
purposes on the sides of the newly constructed canal. 19
Damages
In Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co. v. Miller20 the Third
Circuit ruled that the addition of a second pipeline servitude
resulted in a thirty per cent loss in market value and that,
consistent with prior jurisprudence, this percentage loss would
be deemed to affect adjacent footage along the servitude. 21
Earlier in Dixie Pipeline Co. v. Barry22 the Third Circuit had
held that the taking of a third servitude was deemed to further
reduce adjacent property values. While it is not clear from the
Miller opinion exactly what is the jurisprudence with which it
is sought to be consistent, there is quoted in the Barry case
an appraiser's statement that the "Veterans Administration...
will not accept a residence for financing within 300 feet from
a pipeline," a factor which, if applicable, would seem to sustain
the additional damage deemed to result in Miller from widening
the existing servitude.23
Where a partial taking in conjunction with rerouting a
highway results in a diversion of traffic, the general rule is to
the effect that such damages as may be suffered by the rerouting
are damnum absque injuria. Our supreme court adhered to this
rule in Cerniglia v. City of New Orleans.24 The rule was again
applied in State, Department of Highways v. Chesson 5 over
the argument of the expropriatee that the rerouting resulted
not only in compensable damages from the diversion of traffic but
in special damages to his property in that only the rear of his
service station faced the highway after the partial taking. None-
19. 229 So.2d 139, 142-45 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
20. 229 So.2d 182 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), reheartng denied, Jan. 7, 1970,
cert. denied, 255 La. 482, 231 So.2d 395 (1970).
21. Id. at 184.
22. 227 So.2d 1 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
23. Id. at 10.
24. 234 La. 730, 101 So.2d 218 (1958).
25. 229 So.2d 763 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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theless, a majority of the Third Circuit held that the general
rule was applicable since the state had the right to change
highway locations without being responsible in damages to those
fronting on the former highway.26 However, in a concurring
opinion one of the judges noted an exception to the Cerniglia
rule permitting a property owner to recover damages if harmed
by a taking in a way particular to him. The concurring judge
would have applied the exception here, where as a result of
a combination of partial taking with rerouting, damages not
shared by others in the vicinity had been suffered by the
owner.2
In State, Department of Highways v. Mason28 the expro-
priatee argued that severance damages should be measured
by the "cost to cure," consisting of the full cost of restoring
the service station to the condition existing prior to the taking
of a ten-foot frontal strip. Our supreme court rejected this
"cost to cure" concept, noting that such an approach has
relevance to the measure of damages "only ... to demonstrate
a diminution in market value resulting from the partial
taking .... " 2 It further noted the approach should be used only
"in special instances wherein the ascertainment of market value
of the facility is not possible."30 The rule as approved by the
court was stated to be "the measure of compensation when part
of the tract is taken is the difference between a fair market
value of the whole tract before the taking and the fair market
value of what remains after the taking."' Under this "before
and after rule" the court found that the expropriatee had dem-
onstrated no diminution of value in the remainder, and affirmed
an award limited to the fair market value of the expropriated
land and improvements.8 2
In Reymond v. State, Department of Highways8 our supreme
court limited the liability of a public body for property damaged
but not included within the actual expropriated area "to those
instances where there is a physical taking or damage to that
property or a special damage peculiar to the particular property
and not general damage sustained by other properties similarly
26. Id. at 764-65.
27. Id. at 766-67.
28. 254 La. 1035, 229 So.2d 89 (1969), rehearing denied, Dec. 15, 1969.
29. Id. at 1046, 229 So.2d at 93.
30. Id. at 1046-47, 229 So.2d at 93.
31. Id. at 1045, 229 So.2d at 93.
32. Id. at 1047-50, 229 So.2d at 94.
33. 255 La. 425, 231 So.2d 375 (1970).
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located. '8 4 Applying that rule to the facts presented, it disallowed
damages both for impairment of access and damages due to
traffic noise as not being special damages entitled to be recovered.
Such unrecoverable damages were not limited to the expro-
priatee and her neighbors or even to the neighborhood; all
owners of nearby property suffered the noise of traffic and the
necessity of viewing less pleasant surroundings. 5 The court
also stated that physical damage recoverable must be approxi-
mately caused by the improvement or be the immediate direct
and necessary result thereof. 6 Consequently, the court limited
the award to a sum representing diminution in market value
of plaintiff's residence by reason of structural damage attri-
butable to vibration from pile driving activityY' The court
rejected an argument that article 667 of the Civil Code was
applicable, confining that article to damages stemming from
structural changes in or on the land and not to work carried on
thereon.88
Methods of Valuation
Over a period of many years, valuation of expropriated
leasehold interests has presented the courts with perplexing
problems. Last term, in State, Department of Highways v.
Holmes,9 our supreme court corrected a leasehold valuation
approach earlier approved which resulted in duplication of com-
pensation to the expropriatees. In that case it was decided that
where there had been a valuation of the entire estate, including
the leasehold interest, the state's obligation to pay just com-
pensation was discharged by the payment of that entire value.
Since the value of the leasehold advantage was included in the
value of the entire estate, the expropriator could properly
apportion that value between lessor and lessee but additional
payment to the lessee was error.4° The Holmes jurisprudence
was applied in State, Department of Highways v. D & J Realty
Co.,4 1 resulting in reversal of a Second Circuit decision which
had awarded the value of the leasehold advantage to the lessee
34. Id. at 447, 231 So.2d at 383.
35. Id. at 448-49, 231 So.2d at 384.
36. Id. at 450, 231 So.2d at 384.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 438-45, 231 So.2d at 380-83.
39. 253 La. 1099, 221 So.2d 811 (1969). See Note, 30 LA. L. Rsv. 285, 346
(1969); see also M. DAKIN AND M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 285
(1970).
40. 253 La. 1099, 1110-11, 221 So.2d 811, 815 (1969).
41. 254 La. 1149, 229 So.2d 344 (1969), rehearing denied, Dec. 15, 1969.
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in addition to awarding the value of the entire property to the
lessor.4
2
The D & J Realty Co. decision may also be regarded as
approval of the method of valuation used in arriving at the
value of the leasehold advantage, although the method was not
a matter for court consideration. Thus, whereas in some earlier
cases the leasehold advantage had been valued by calculating
the advantage in dollars per month and multiplying this amount
by the number of months for which the leasehold was to be held,
in this case the leasehold advantage was properly valued by ar-
riving at the leasehold advantage per month and discounting such
monthly amounts as an annuity at an appropriate interest rate
reflecting the risks applicable to the particular leasehold.48
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Louisiana and Arkansas
Railway" the Second Circuit valued a servitude across a railroad
right of way at $62.00 by using the "going rate" for the property
rights taken.4 5 In an earlier instance, the same railroad had per-
suaded the court to accept evaluation of a similar right of way
based upon discounting an annual rental of $20.00 in perpetuity
at six per cent for a present value of $333.00. The railroad urged
that the same approach be used.46 The court refused and disposed
of its prior jurisprudence by noting that it had not intended
to establish an exclusive method of assessing value. It did not
attempt to reconcile the disparate results except to note that
the present servitude was in a country area whereas the prior
servitude was in an urban area, a circumstance probably irrele-
vant in the expropriation of railroad right of way.4 7 More
relevant would have been a recognition that the previously
capitalized rental was excessive in terms of the value now
arrived at on the basis of comparable sales.
In State, Department of Highways v. Cefalu4s a tract of
unimproved land had been leased for $350.00 per month because
of its position adjacent to a projected interchange; some eleven
per cent of the tract was taken as a temporary work servitude
42. Id. at 1160-61, 229 So.2d at 348.
43. Id.
44. 234 So.2d 231 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
45. Id. at 233. Cf. Michigan Wis. Pipeline Co. v. Fruge, 227 So.2d 606
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), rehearing denied, Oct. 22, 1969, second rehearing
denied, Oct. 23, 1969, cert. denied, 255 La. 149, 229 So.2d 732 (1970).
46. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Louisiana and Ark. Rwy., 165 So.2d 317
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 246 La. 831, 167 So.2d 664 (1964).
47. 234 So.2d 231, 232 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
48. 233 So.2d 273 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, April 13,
1970, cert. denied, 256 La. 373, 236 So.2d 502 (1970).
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in connection therewith. During the construction period, it was
estimated that the rental of the entire tract for storage purposes
would not be more than $50.00 per month, and the trial judge
concluded that the lessee would thus lose $300.00 per month
for the work period; therefore, he was entitled to severance
damages of $10,500. The First Circuit designated such loss as
damnum absque injuria and disallowed it.49 There was evidence
in the record, however, that comparable sales of property, made
without taking the improvement into account, had been at the
rate of forty cents per square foot, and on this basis the court
arrived at a fair market value of $2,600 for the tract taken;
,it then allowed a ten per cent return on this sum for a period
of three years as damages.5 Awarding the undiscounted value
for three years ignores the fact that no informed investor would
pay such undiscounted amount; he would pay only the present
value of the payments treated as an annuity and discounted
at an appropriate rate of interest.51
In Cypress-Black Bayou Recreation and Water Conservation
District v. Conger52 the land taken was conceded to have as its
highest and best use development as a residential subdivision.
The trial judge had accepted as the fair market value of the
property an estimate based on sale of the raw acreage as
residential lots less development costs. The Second Circuit
rejected this approach as placing too great an emphasis on
the price at which individual residential lots could be sold
and consequently as indulging in assumptions too uncertain and
conjectural. It annulled the award and remanded the case for
a determination of the "value [of] the property on an acreage
basis, in its present condition as raw land suitable for sub-
division purposes, that is, what a developer would pay for the
unimproved land."53 Despite rejection by the court, the so-called
"subdivision residual method" has been used in Louisiana; the
validity of its use will of course turn on the reality of deductions
for developers' costs.04
49. Id. at 275.
50. Id. at 278.
51. State, Dept. of Highways v. Cockerham, 182 So.2d 786 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 249 La. 110, 185 So.2d 219 (1966); see also M. DAKIN
AND M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 285 (1970).
52. 234 So.2d 212 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), rehearing denied, April 28, 1970.
53. Id. at 215.
54. State, Dept. of Highways v. Colomb, 225 So.2d 280 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969), rehearing denied, July 31, 1969, cert. denied, 254 La. 839, 227 So.2d
589 (1969). See cases collected in M. DAKIN AND M. KLMN, EMINENT DOMAIN
IN LOUmANA 203 and following (1970).
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In State, Department of Highways v. Colomb55 the Fourth
Circuit did in fact apply the "subdivision residual method"
rejected by the Second Circuit. In this instance, the court con-
cluded that development of the tract for subdivision purposes
was its highest and best use and was reasonably prospective.
It accepted an estimate of value based on retail lot sales less
only a ten per cent "builder's discount" and rejected an estimate
which would have reduced retail lot sale price by a twenty-five
per cent developer's profit and a ten per cent advertising and
marketing cost estimate, reasoning that a well-informed owner
would be best advised to develop the particular property himself
and eliminate developer's profit. 55 It should be noted, however,
that even though the landowner serves as his own developer,
he would still have to take the time to show the land to prospec-
tive buyers, and he would incur advertising costs. In addition,
the cost of carrying the investment would have to be taken into
account. All of these factors are presumably involved in the
twenty-five to thirty-five per cent discount alluded to by the
Department of Highways and rejected by the court as discount
for developer's and marketing costs.u
Procedural Matters
In Columbia Gulf Transmission Co. v. C. J. Grayson, Inc.18
a pipeline company, proceeding under the general expropria-
tion statute, obtained a judgment adjudicating the property to
the expropriator and awarding compensation to the expropriatee.
The expropriator took title but appealed the amount of the com-
pensation award; the expropriatee sought dismissal of the appeal
on the ground that the expropriator was appealing from a divis-
ible judgment and had failed to designate the portion com-
plained of pursuant to article 2085 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. The Second Circuit, noting that the expropriator was
appealing under an expropriation statute"9 which had no provi-
sion with respect to specifying the portion of the judgment com-
plained of, found no legislative intent to repeal such existing
special appeals statutes in enacting the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. o
55. 225 So.2d 280 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), rehearing denied, July 31,
1969, cert. denied, 254 La. 839, 227 So.2d 589 (1969).
56. Id. at 283-84.
57. M. DAKIN AND M. KLmN, EMINIENT DOMAIN IN LOUIsIANA 208-11 (1970).
58. 232 So.2d 150 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
59. LA. R.S. 19:13 (1950).
60. 232 So.2d 150, 153 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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In Humble Pipeline Co. v. Roy Aucoin, Inc.6 1 the expro-
priatee called in cross-examination an appraiser who had been
employed by the expropriator to make an appraisal but whose
appraisal was not utilized by the expropriator and who was not
called as a witness by him. The expropriatee relied upon article
1634 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides: "Any party
or his representative may be called as a witness and cross
examined by an adverse party without the latter vouching for
his credibility, or being precluded from impeaching his testi-
mony." The article also defines representative as an "officer,
agent or employee having supervision or knowledge of the
matter in controversy. . . ." The expropriator maintained that
the appraiser was not their representative and therefore should
not have been called in cross-examination. On appeal, the First
Circuit agreed and overruled the case the expropriatee relied
upon as precedent.62 The error occurred, the First Circuit noted,
as a result of an improper extension of State, Department of
Highways v. Cook,8 in which the expropriatee was permitted
to call in cross-examination, in a procedure under the highway
"quick-taking" statute, the appraiser who had signed the certif-
icate of appraisal introduced in the proceeding but who had
not been called to testify. In State, Department of Highways v.
Kurtz64 the expropriatee was permitted to call in cross-examina-
tion an appraiser who had been employed by the expropriator
but who had not signed the estimate of just compensation
annexed to the expropriator's petition. The First Circuit spe-
cifically overruled the Kurtz holding and stated that even the
Cook holding should be limited to the special circumstances
prevailing under the highway "quick-taking" statute where an
appraiser signs the declaration of just compensation but is not
called as a witness by the expropriator. 5 In the instant case
under the general expropriation statute,"6 since there was no
signing of a declaration of just compensation by the appraiser,
there was no basis under the Cook holding for calling the ap-
praiser in cross-examination.
In State, Department of Highways v. Hunt,6 7 our supreme
court again applied the State, Department of Highways v.
61. 230 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), rehearing denied, Feb. 2, 1970.
62. Id. at 374.
63. 124 So.2d 221 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
64. 143 So.2d 761 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
65. 230 So.2d 365, 375 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
66. LA. R.S. 19:2.1 (1950).
67. 255 La. 513, 231 So.2d 563 (1970), rehearing denied, Feb. 23, 1970.
[Vol. 31
1971] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1969-1970 335
Baddock8 rule to preclude reduction of the amount deposited
in court by the department unless it has been specifically put
in issue by the department. In the Hunt case, the department
appealed an award for compensation and severance damages
in excess of deposit and, on appeal, succeeded on original hear-
ing in reducing the award for compensation and eliminating
severance damages. On rehearing, however, the First Circuit
restored the amount of severance damages included in the
original deposit, since the department had failed to apply for a
rehearing specifically as to this portion of the judgment. How-
ever, since the award of compensation was greater than the
amount of the deposit reduced by such severance damages,
the court simply added the amount of severance damages to
the original deposit.69 On review, the supreme court affirmed
the application of the Baddock rule but eliminated the excessive
part of the severance damages.7 0 The so-called Baddock rule
provided that "'should the Department seek at the trial any
determination of just and adequate compensation, whether for
the land taken or severance damages, lower than the estimate
contained in its initial petition, it is incumbent upon the Depart-
ment to so notify the defendant by filing an amended pleading
setting forth this revised sum and give satisfactory reasons there-
for at the trial.'"' (Emphasis deleted.) A dissenting justice
would overrule Baddock on the ground that it violates the pro-
vision in the statute: "If the compensation finally awarded is
less than the amount so deposited, the Court shall enter judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff and against the proper parties for
the amount of the excess. ' 72 The dissenting justice was of the
opinion that the statute would not allow the innovation set
forth in Baddock.73
In Reymond v. State, Department of Highways,7 4 our
supreme court stated: "One of the primary reasons for granting
a writ in this case was to clear up the confusion in the appellate
jurisprudence as to whether the Department of Highways is
immune from suit."75 In the interim prior to decision, however,
68. 170 So.2d 5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 247 La. 351, 170
So.2d 867 (1965).
69. 219 So.2d 602 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
70. 255 La. 513, 231 So.2d 563 (1970).
71. Id. at 526, 231 So.2d at 568.
72. LA. R.S. 48:456 (1954).
73. 255 La. 513, 526, 231 So.2d 563, 568 (1970).
74. 255 La. 425, 231 So.2d 375 (1970), rehearing denied, Feb. 23, 1970
75. Id. at 436, 231 So.2d at 379.
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the court decided Herrin v. Perry,70 which held that the con-
stitutional clause 7 and implementing legislation 78 which per-
mitted the department to sue and be sued effectuated a general
waiver of the immunity from suit formerly enjoyed. Since the
Herrin case was a suit in tort, this was deemed to effectively
dispose of the argument that the court had never held the phrase
to "sue and be sued" to be a waiver of immunity in actions
in tort.79 The court also noted that it had said in Hamilton v.
City of Shreveport0 that the scope of the constitutional "amend-
ment cannot be limited by this court since it is clear and precise
in its wording. It enumerates all the governmental bodies that
are to be affected, and makes the waiver of their immunity from
suit and liability '. . . for all purposes . . .' all-inclusive."81
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
License Taxes
Amongst the welter of "statutory" provisions contained in
our Constitution is one exempting the pursuit of agriculture
from occupational license taxes.' In Stanford v. Louisiana Sweet
Potato Advertising and Development Commission,2 plaintiffs
using this constitutional provision attacked a legislative act
which prescribed a "tax" on all shipments of sweet potatoes for
which the inspection certificates and tags of the Louisiana State
Department of Agriculture and Immigration had issued; the
tax was to be imposed upon and collected from the shipper.8
While the supreme court did not preclude the possibility of a
constitutional fee covering only the cost of certification of sweet
potatoes, here the determination was that the fee, if such it were,
clearly exceeded the legitimate cost of regulation and the neces-
sary or probable expenses of licensing, inspecting, and regulating
the agricultural pursuit of raising sweet potatoes and was hence
really a tax thereon.4 The fact that the proceeds of the fee were
76. 254 La. 933, 228 So.2d 649 (1969).
77. LA. CONsT. art. III, § 35.
78. LA. R.S. 48:22 (1950).
79. 255 La. 425, 437, 231 So.2d 375, 379 (1970).
80. 247 La. 784, 174 So.2d 529 (1965).
81. 255 La. 425, 438, 231 So.2d 375, 380 (1970).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CONST. art. X, § 8.
2. 255 La. 96, 229 So.2d 712 (1969).
S. La. Acts 1942, No. 294.
4. 255 La. 96, 101-02, 229 So.2d 712, 714 (1969).
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